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Talking Points

Lebanese Army Capability in the Southern Security Zone

Security Requirements

If all foreign forces withdraw from Lebanon, the Lebanese Army would still face several security problems apart from policing the southern security zone.

Factional fighting would probably break out in several areas:

- Between Druze and Christians following Israeli withdrawal from the Shuf and Alayh regions.
- Between Alawites and Sunnis in Tripoli following a Syrian troop withdrawal.
- Between the Christian Lebanese Forces militia and Sulayman Franjiyah's militia in the north.

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The Army or the MNF would need to maintain a strong presence in the Bekaa Valley and in the north to prevent PLO infiltration from Syria. The borders would be the first line of defense for the southern security zone.

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The Army would probably have to remain in the Beirut area to maintain order and to demonstrate government dominance over the Lebanese Forces. The Lebanese Army currently maintains the equivalent of 2 brigades in the Beirut area.

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Army Capabilities

Since the beginning of this year, US assistance and a major shakeup by the Lebanese Army Commander, General Tannous, have significantly upgraded the capabilities of the Lebanese Army.

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-- Personnel changes have removed many incompetent and corrupt officers.

-- US supplied equipment has corrected major deficiencies in 4 of the army's 7 brigades.

-- Morale and training have improved. [REDACTED]

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The Lebanese Army probably is capable of dealing with any single challenge to its authority.

-- The Haddad Force in the south is ill trained and poorly equipped, depending on the Israeli army for its support.

-- Any PLO infiltration would be on a small scale. PLO guerrillas could not match Lebanese Army in strength or firepower. [REDACTED]

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The Lebanese Army's job in policing the south probably would be easier than what the Israelis now face, assuming continued cooperation from the Haddad force.

-- PLO evacuation from Lebanon would eliminate a haven bordering the southern security zone.

-- The population--strongly anti-PLO--would probably be more cooperative in aiding the Lebanese Army. [REDACTED]

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Although it has the capability of policing the south effectively, maintaining security throughout the rest of the country would severely strain the manpower resources of Lebanon's 22,000 man army. [REDACTED]

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In the near term, deploying one brigade in the southern security zone, one brigade in Beirut and one in the Bekaa Valley, will leave the Lebanese Army with only one brigade at 70%

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strength and three others seriously understrength for guarding the northern borders and policing the rest of the country.

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the Lebanese Army would require 7 brigades at 100% strength to extend government control throughout Lebanon.

- Lebanon's Army will have only 4 brigades plus 3 battalions at 70 percent strength by the end of March 1983.
- A fifth brigade is scheduled to be at 75 percent strength by February 1984.
- The two remaining brigades are at 50 percent strength or less.
- Reaching the 7 brigade requirement will require at least two years.
- Absorbing elements of the Haddad force, and using the 7,000 man Internal Security Force would ease but not solve the manpower problem.

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Talking Points for the DCI
11 March 1983

ISRAEL: Intentions in Southern Lebanon
Israelis have been pursuing economic, military, and political
policies in southern Lebanon--some predating last summer's
invasion--designed to serve a number of purposes.

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The most immediate Israeli goal is to prevent the return of a PLO
military structure to southern Lebanon. To achieve this goal,
the Israelis believe the area south of the Awwali River must be a
permanent Israeli military cordon sanitaire even at the expense
of Lebanese central government authority. In their view this
requires:

- A network of Lebanese surrogates--controlled by Major
Haddad--who will keep the PLO out.
- Substantial freedom of movement for the IDF in the south.
- Neither a UNIFIL nor an MNF presence in southern
Lebanon. The Israelis regard these forces as ineffectual
at best, and likely to interfere with Israel's ability to
control the situation.

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Prime Minister Begin wants these kinds of security arrangements
to avoid any more second-guessing concerning the long-term value
of Operation "Peace for Galilee".


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Israeli actions also are meant to enhance Tel Aviv's position in
the negotiations.


- IDF's strengthening of Haddad is intended to give the
Lebanese Government no option but to retain Haddad as
military kingpin in the south.

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-- Israel believes that the development of economic ties with Lebanon will make it more costly for Beirut to renege on any normalization agreements. 

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Israeli policies in southern Lebanon preserve maximum flexibility for Tel Aviv in the event negotiations drag on or break down.

-- Strengthening of surrogates in the area will ease the IDF's burden during a prolonged stay.



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Israel's Occupation of Southern Lebanon

The Israeli Defense Force has now entered its tenth month of occupation of Lebanon. During this time, the Israelis have become involved in almost every aspect of southern Lebanese life. Although much of the Israeli activity is justified by the exigencies of military occupation, many of Israel's actions in southern Lebanon reflect more extensive economic, security, and political goals that Israel has been pursuing since Operation Litani in 1978 when Haddad was set up as the head of "Free Lebanon".

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Israeli Policies

Economic. Israel's involvement in southern Lebanon's economic affairs offers the most clear-cut example of actions that have been taken for reasons other than just those pertaining to the military occupation. Just as quickly as the IDF secured the area beyond the boundaries of Haddad land, Israeli businessmen travelled there to explore the economic opportunities available. By late summer, Israeli goods, primarily foodstuffs, began appearing in southern Lebanese towns and villages, as well as in Beirut. The disruption of the local economy during the fighting in the region and subsequent IDF prohibitions, for security reasons, on certain forms of economic activity, such as fishing, facilitated the Israeli penetration of Lebanese markets. Moreover, the IDF has also prohibited some Lebanese farmers in the south from trucking their produce to Beirut.

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Precise information on the extent of current Israeli involvement in the southern Lebanese economy is limited but press

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estimates of the monthly value of Israeli exports to the area range from \$10 to \$70 million. Even the low figure of \$10 million worth of goods per month exceeds the current level of Israeli non-oil trade with Egypt. In recent months, Israeli goods marketed under Lebanese tradenames reportedly have begun appearing in other Arab states--a development that in part led to the imposition of Saudi and Jordanian restrictions on trade with Lebanon. [REDACTED]

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In addition to providing foodstuffs and manufactured goods, the Israelis have also begun extending certain basic services, such as bus routes, to the area. Haifa has been opened to southern Lebanese merchants as a duty free port. The Israelis have quickly repaired infrastructure, such as electricity, water, and telephone services, disrupted by the invasion. The Israelis have recently demonstrated their sensitivity to Lebanese charges of unfair trade practices by claiming to have halted the export of agricultural products that compete with Lebanese-produced goods. Nonetheless, observers note that Jaffa oranges are still on sale in Beirut. [REDACTED]

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Military. The Israelis have made a number of moves aimed at helping Major Haddad and his 1,500 man Christian-Shia militia consolidate their control over Lebanese territory south of the Awwali River. Israel is also attempting to create local militias, which--the Israelis believe--will eventually ally themselves with Haddad. These militias are intended to provide the IDF with the flexibility to play one group against the other or even against Haddad if his actions at some point run contrary

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[redacted]

to Israeli interests. The most important of these groups, the Shiite National Guard--numbering to date less than 100 men, is led by Karim Khalil, the scion of the most prominent Shiite family in Tyre. [redacted]

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On 14 February, Haddad entered Sidon at the head of a column of about a dozen tanks and APC's. Haddad seized a vacated hospital in Sidon, declared it to be the permanent headquarters of his "Free Lebanon" army, and informed the press that his enclave now extended from the Lebanese-Israeli border to the Awwali River. IDF heavy vehicles transported Haddad's equipment to Sidon to prepare for his dramatic entry into the city. [redacted]

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Haddad's men had been active previously as far north as the Sidon area, but their presence in the region had been limited largely to a few scattered roadblocks. With this latest entry into Sidon, Haddad--with Israeli backing--intends to stake his claim as de facto military governor of the south. To this end, Haddad has announced his intentions to enlarge significantly his militia. [redacted]

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Israeli efforts to develop local militias among non-Christian groups in southern Lebanon--particularly among the Shiite Muslims, who account for 80 percent of the region's population--are intended to strengthen Haddad's hand. The IDF so far has armed over half a dozen local militias--most of which number only a handful of men--with jurisdictions limited to small defined areas, such as Tyre. [redacted]

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[REDACTED]

To further strengthen Haddad's hand in the south, the IDF has engaged in a protracted harassment of UNIFIL to limit its authority in its areas of responsibility. Tel Aviv probably hopes that by preventing UNIFIL from performing its duties, it will discourage participating nations from renewing their mandate and demonstrate the ineffectiveness of UNIFIL as a viable peacekeeping force. Harassment of UNIFIL also demonstrates to the local population that authority rests with the IDF and Haddad. [REDACTED]

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Political. Israeli actions in the political field have tended to undermine the authority of central government institutions in southern Lebanon, which, in any case, had little real authority in the region. The IDF has appointed a civil action team for southern Lebanon that has begun to offer some of the services for which the Lebanese Government theoretically is responsible. In addition, the Lebanese governor for the south has accused the Israelis of harassing him and his employees by forcing them to evacuate many of their Sidon offices, and, in some cases, by threatening to deport officials who do not cooperate with the Israelis. [REDACTED]

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
In late January, the IDF called a meeting of village heads to discuss the formation of village committees and a coordinating

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council that would cooperate with Israeli authorities. The



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Israeli and Lebanese Negotiating Positions on Security Arrangements as of 8 March

	<u>Israeli Position</u> (Shamir's proposals may differ)	<u>Lebanese Position</u>
Observation Posts in Security Zone	Insists on five Israeli-manned observation posts unless Lebanese offer more effective alternatives than they are now willing to consider.	No residual Israeli presence on Lebanese soil; security maintained by Lebanese Army alone.
Status of Major Haddad	Appointed commander of territorial brigade in southern Lebanon; his forces integrated as a unit into territorial brigade. Selection of brigade's officers subject to Israeli approval. Approval also would be required for any changes in the brigade's organization, deployment or equipment.	Will not agree to any of these proposals. Will treat Haddad "honorably", possibly retaining him as an officer in brigade, but no command position; some of his forces integrated as regulars, others converted into paramilitary force.
Joint Supervisory Teams/Patrols	Daily patrols to verify compliance with security provisions.	Regular verification by joint 2-man teams accompanied only by Lebanese troops. Israeli member not to remain overnight.
Operations Center in Security Zone	24-hour per day joint operations center to operate as part of the military liaison committee, and serve as departure point for supervisory patrols.	Lebanese negotiators deferred issue, but Lebanese Army Commander Tannous privately agreed in principle.
Israeli Flights Over Lebanon	Insists on right to conduct reconnaissance missions over Lebanon.	Lebanese unwilling to include issue in agreement, but concede they cannot prevent Israeli flights.
Naval Coordination	Wants detailed navy-to-navy coordination and cooperation, to include right to hot pursuit in Lebanese territorial waters.	Accept in principle naval coordination and cooperation, but do not want agreement in writing.

Intelligence Coordination

Wants coordination between intelligence services and cooperation on special operations against terrorist activities; freedom of access and movement within security zone for Israeli intelligence personnel.

Details of coordination not appropriate to withdrawal agreement and should be left to the intelligence services to effectuate.

Contact Between Commanders in the Border Area

Wants direct contact, including face to face meetings, to coordinate anti-terrorist activities.

Lebanese concur.

Border Entry Points

Besides officially established border checkpoints, Israel wants unofficial entry points for joint supervisory team personnel.

Lebanese oppose.

Pardon of Collaborators

Proposed that Lebanese who have collaborated with Israel be free from punishment or prosecution for that collaboration after Israeli withdrawal.

Maintains this is not a security issue and should be handled through other channels.

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